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Abstract 
This paper examines the standing of private firms in the post-privatization economic reform in 
China regarding their access to human capital. The cross-sectional dataset used to test the model 
is extracted from the World Bank 2012 Enterprise Survey. Using a sample of 2848 Chinese firms 
of diverse ownership types, the paper studies the effect of firm ownership on human capital, and 
further studies the effect of human capital on firm performance in terms of growth and expansion 
possibilities. The results are mixed: significant evidence supporting the claim that private firms 
are human capital constrained in terms of skilled and trained labor force, yet also suggesting that 
private firms get better educated labor compared to their state-owned counterparts. It might no 
longer be the case that private firms are disadvantaged in the access to the more educated labor, 
but only in the utilization of such qualified labor. The findings also suggest that the presence of 
skilled labor in private firms significantly improves their performance. The outcomes propose 
that the reforms are far from perfect or complete for China which is still expected to undergo a 
lot of changes to successfully finish its transition and preserve its rapidly growing trajectory. To 
succeed in acquiring the qualified labor with good human capital, policy recommendations might 
consider paying more attention to the pool of talent within the country and the recruitment 
channels, and also supplying the private firms with the needed funds for adopting training 
programs. 
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1 Introduction 
From state-socialism to opening-up and modern corporations, China has witnessed great 
transformations over the last decades. Moving from being centrally planned to a more open 
market-orientated economy, the emergence of privately-owned enterprises has widely increased 
since the 1978 economic reform in China. It is no longer a surprise that the privatization 
phenomenon played a vital role in contributing to China’s economic growth over the years 
(Anderson et al., 2003). An increase from $110 to $994 of GDP per capita took place between 
the years 1978 and 2002 (World Bank, 2004). Yet, as the idea of privatization was newly born in 
China’s transition market, private firms were greatly stigmatized for a long period of time, being 
labeled as “red hat firms” and “profiteers”, thus causing resources to be channeled into state-
owned enterprises (Nee and Opper, 2012, p.110). To solve the problem of this pariah-like status 
that was pinned to the newly emerging private firms, they hid under other labels such as Joint 
Stock (JSC) and Limited Liability Companies (LLC) (Nee and Opper, 2012, p.114). However, 
financial institutions and state banks kept on favoring the state-owned firms for a long period of 
time (Peng and Heat, 1996). Not only were private firms financially constrained, but also 
constrained in other areas such as accessibility to human capital (Garnaut et al., 2012).  
Human capital is the utilization of the workers’ knowledge, skills and experience to add 
to the value of the individuals themselves, their firm, or their country (Schultz, 1961). It is 
mainly the combination of workers’ education, skills and work experience which makes their 
contribution to the firm more valuable. The labor force, on the other hand, is an indispensable 
living entity for a country that must be carefully nurtured and taken care of. Since the labor 
market is greatly formed by the educational system and opportunities present within the country 
(Taylor, 2011), it would be valuable to invest in human capital. Over the decades, education 
became widely and invariably acknowledged as a main driver of economic growth (Lau and 
Yotopoulos, 1989; Ada and Acaroğlu, 2014; Jin and Jin; 2014). Education is a form of 
investment in human capital which leads to higher productivity for a worker and the firm itself 
(Lau et al., 1991).  
Access to resources and capital is greatly affected by the ownership type of a Chinese 
firm (Nee and Opper, 2012). Diverse firm ownership types require different needs for resource 
utilization; meaning that, firms allocate their human and capital resources differently depending 
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whether they are private or state-owned, thus rendering the efficiency level of resource 
utilization diverse (Ju and Zhao, 2009). Given the influence of ownership type on resource 
acquisition, Foneska et al. (2014) distinguish between two broad ownership types of Chinese 
firms: private-owned enterprises (POEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose general 
characteristics differ.  Not only are SOEs larger and more complex, but also more loaded with a 
diversity of resources from raw materials to human capital (Peng et al., 2004). To understand 
why private firms may experience a lasting and significant disadvantage even after the reforms, 
it is important to know more about the situation in China and its ownership system, as well as the 
labor market and their allocation system both before the reforms period and after it. 
 For a long period of time, having a state-sector job meant enjoying nonwage benefits 
related to social insurance, child and health care, housing and pensions (Cai et al., 2008). It is no 
surprise that citizens looking for a job would favor working at a state-owned firm. In addition to 
that, the stigma attached to the newly emerging private firms did not make it any easier for 
educated fresh graduates to pick a job in the private sector. Not only were private firms less 
appealing in terms of lack of nonwage benefits, but also in terms of the pariah-like status which 
was attached to them. This thesis is concerned with testing whether it is still the case that private 
firms are disadvantaged in accessing the good human capital, or whether the reforms have taken 
care of this aspect and created a fair playing field for both types of firm ownerships: the state and 
the private.   
1.1. Research questions 
Evidence from studies on firms all around the world have shown the importance of 
human capital for a firm’s performance (Youndt et al., 1996; Huselid et al., 1997; Shrader and 
Siegel, 2007), especially firm-specific human capital (Crook et al., 2011). A firm enjoying 
adequate physical and financial capital is not sufficient for its success if it lacks the required 
human capital and skilled labor (Lau et al., 1991). If human capital does in fact matter for firm 
development, then being constrained in that area poses a problem for the private firms’ 
development in the highly competitive Chinese economy (Tan, 2002).  
Several studies investigate human capital in China (Heckman, 2002 and 2005; Li et al., 
2009) and its impact on firm performance (Marimuthu et al., 2009; Heckman and Yi, 2012). Yet, 
the literature has not examined the effect of different ownership types on human capital structure 
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in China recently. Do Chinese private firms still face disadvantages in accessing human capital 
today? To that extent, does human capital really matter for firm performance? It is vital to 
understand the effects of ownership type on the ability to access and exploit human capital since 
it may affect firm’s overall performance. The implication being the following: If private firms 
are still stigmatized and limited with respect to human capital access and if human capital does in 
fact matter for firm performance, then policymakers should address these human capital 
shortages in private firms for better economic growth chances in China. 
1.2. Method and material  
Using a sample of 2848 Chinese firms from a 2012 World Bank manufacturing 
Enterprise Survey, the present study addresses these research gaps and extends previous research 
related to China’s human capital constraint to examine whether private firms still face shortages 
in accessing the desired human capital. The model uses the 2012 cross-sectional dataset from the 
World Bank in order to investigate the type of ownership (POEs or SOEs) effect on human 
capital quality, and to further study how different levels of human capital affect firm’s 
performance. In order to determine the possible associations, the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model is used to test the hypotheses as this method gives unbiased consistent 
estimates given the available dataset (World Bank, 2013). 
1.3. Limitations 
Even though the dataset might be the most adequate and most recent available one to 
study the research questions at hand, it is not perfect. Possible limitations in the survey preceding 
the dataset caused some obstacles; those include but are not limited to: low response rates, long 
survey length, and missing observations. However, the interviewers made a lot of effort to 
reconcile these challenges by recruiting professional teams, performing thousands of callbacks, 
and pointing out advantages resulting from participation in the survey.  
Another more general limitation to the analysis is the appropriate proxy measures for 
firm performance. The measure total sales per employee might not capture the whole dimension 
of performance as more data is needed to account for the growth of a firm. It might be better to 
use alternative measures for firm performance such as Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE) (Nee and Opper, 2007), but this variable was not provided for the companies in 
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the dataset. Additionally, using ownership as a binary dummy variable, where 1 indicates 
privately-owned and 0 indicates state-owned, when in fact more types of ownerships exist in 
China such as foreign-owned firms, could also be considered a shortcoming to the analysis. 
Despite the fact that the dataset suffers from these flaws, the problems are not atypical to the 
common ones faced when dealing with enterprise surveys. Whether it is issues with the dataset 
or other survey imperfections, the problems should be carefully addressed and dealt with to solve 
potential flaws that might bias the estimates of interest. 
1.4. Disposition 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
background in light of prior studies related to this subject, describes the policy background in 
China before and after reform, discusses private firms’ accessibility to human capital as well as 
human capital’s association with firm performance; it also develops the main research 
hypotheses. Section 3 explores possible limitations in the dataset and efforts to reconcile them, 
presents the model specification and describes the variables of interest in detail with their 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results, alternative measures for robustness checks, 
and a discussion of outcome implications. Section 5 finally concludes by shedding light on 
possible policy recommendations, certain limitations, and future research. 
2 Theoretical background and Research Hypotheses 
To realize why private firms may experience substantial shortcomings and inefficiencies, 
it is important to understand the disadvantages brought about by the socialist system which 
emerged in China for decades before the reform. For the purpose of this analysis, the thoughts 
adopted by major economists in history will be elaborated on. During the period before the 
reform, China’s economy was dominated by the inefficient socialist regime. According to Karl 
Marx, socialism is one of the classical ideologies whose goal can be briefly described as one that 
aims at constructing an economy on the basis of common ownership or state collectivization of 
private property. Under the socialist regime equality reigned as everyone receives an equal 
income regardless of whether one was working according to one’s ability or not (Rothbard, 
1991).  
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Prior to the 1978 economic reform, the state had a major influence regarding all matters 
related to the economy. Centuries-old theories put forward by Adam Smith and David Hume 
from the Austrian school of economics (see for example Menger, 1871; Hayek, 1949) argued 
that society doesn’t need a ruler or state control as it merely organizes itself through the 
“Invisible Hand”. Adam Smith (1887) first described the Invisible Hand by referring to a market 
which is self-regulated and free from any government intervention or “mastermind”. He was a 
pioneering advocate of this concept, and the liberty of society and its people. He denied any 
significance for the government involvement, as well as any good that may arise from setting 
policies, plans and recommendations. In his opinion, any government or state action leads to 
failure and is disturbing to the greater order which prevails smoothly due to the “laissez-faire” 
approach. Since only a market system would result in maximized welfare and economic growth, 
society should have faith in the system and the natural order of markets. Individualistic freedom 
and the self-regulating property of the market are enough for the creation of a well-functioning 
society. As deliberate human involvement plays an important role in allowing the normal course 
of action to take place (Smith, 1887), the laborers choice between working in a private or state 
job might in fact matter. Read (1958) also believes that only through the absence of a higher 
order (i.e. a ruler or state) will people make free decisions and allocate themselves in the most 
efficient way possible.  
In explaining the potential invisible network which holds things together, Roberts (2005) 
criticizes policy recommendations and state decisions, and further shows how useless they prove 
to be. Another standard economic theory by Hayek (1949) does not support socialism due to the 
mere fact that it is totalitarian in nature and takes away people’s freedom of choice. He supports 
a more liberal society which should only take from socialism its idealistic nature. Similarly, 
Mises (1990) criticizes the socialist planners for substituting the market mechanism of allocating 
the factors of production by an economic state planning mechanism. In a socialist society, he 
claims, the government is incapable of knowing the true value of the different means of 
production. A socialist market lacks the appropriate pricing of the means of production including 
labor’s wages. He also explains how a capitalist society achieves the adequate resource 
allocation through respecting the subjective values of individuals and hence, its superiority to a 
socialist-run society. In relation to China, had the market been capitalist pre-reform, standard 
economic theory suggests that pricing of outputs and inputs (labor’s wage) would have been easy 
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to achieve by the market mechanism of determining the values of all products and the factors of 
production. Yet, socialism necessarily removed this privilege and forbade the state from valuing 
their means of production. In principle, the above happens because socialist planners lack the 
most vital tool that a capitalist private entrepreneur has: an incentive.  
Post-reform Chinese leaders sought to establish a more open market which is less 
controlled by the state, yet which is in fact not completely free from government intervention. 
Theories adopted by other economists argue that the co-existence of market mechanisms with 
some state intervention would help form a well-functioning economy. For instance, Hayek 
(1967) viewed the market as effective yet imperfect on its own as it needs some guidance from 
the state. Smith (2002) reflects on whether the market should be regulated using state set laws or 
whether it should be allowed to emerge freely and be regulated naturally by an invisible hand. To 
make his point, he distinguishes between two kinds of rationalities: constructivist and ecological. 
On one hand, constructivist rationality is the careful use of reason to explore, analyze and 
recommend rules, similar to the job of the state. On the other hand, ecological rationality 
emerges due to an unintended evolution of markets, norms and social processes. Both are 
interdependent on one another since most institutions do not just arise from policy planning 
alone, but also from the unpredictable natural outcomes of a society. In brief, he theorizes that 
the state and markets should represent some form of coexistence for a prosperous and ongoing 
economy (Smith, 2002). 
2.1. China’s policy background: labor market and ownership system evolution 
The literature widely discusses a major reform which took place in China during the 1978 
and the subgroups of reform alterations which followed the reform era and added to the 
formation of a market-oriented economy (Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Nee and Opper, 2007). In 
that period, China witnessed major transformations which lead its economy to move from state-
socialism to “politicized capitalism”. According to Nee and Opper (2007), a politicized capitalist 
society is one where there is no clear cut division between the affairs of the state and the firm. 
China is currently a mixed society that is home for ongoing market liberalization efforts in the 
presence of uncompleted reforms. Both the economic and political scopes intersect to formulate 
the firms’ decisions. There exists a clear overlap between the government and enterprises’ 
businesses as there is no defined line distinguishing the state and the market.  
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Labor market evolution  
The Chinese labor market has had its share of transformations. The labor allocation 
system was different before the reform period: labor markets were not functioning well and 
laborers were not able to move freely across provinces (Cai et al., 2008). Previously, China used 
to centrally allocate the labor into SOEs and state jobs. The state had developed a system plan 
which not only included agreed upon prices set by the government itself, but also distributed 
various inputs, including labor, administratively into jobs as seen fit (Fleisher and Yang, 2003). 
In order to support the development of heavy industries as requested by the Chinese socialist 
leaders at the time, the workers were given a low wage which was acceptable due to the 
subsistence prices of food and the nonwage benefit system. The urban workers in that socialist 
era received nonwage benefits such as child and health care, housing, and pensions. The sole 
reason why the economy did not fail at that time was that profitability of SOEs was assured 
given the fact that all quantities produced and prices of inputs and outputs were set by the 
government itself (Cai et al., 2008).  
Aside from the workers, firm managers were also not allowed to make independent 
decisions concerning employment and wages as state planners had their hands on the managers’ 
autonomy as well (Lin et al., 1996). Competitive advantage of workers was ruled out as the 
socialist system heavily planned labor distribution into a classification system based on their 
location, region and occupation regardless of their education level or degree. As claimed by Cai 
et al. (2008), the Bureau of Labor and Personnel in China was the only responsible entity to plan 
the labor allocation and match workers to their respective jobs. The authority this Bureau had 
was major as no mobility was allowed after a match had been made between workers and their 
employers. All working citizens were assigned a status, either agricultural or nonagricultural, 
depending on where they were born; this system of registration was known as hukou. A goal of 
full-employment further led to the presence of many redundant workers in state firms. 
Due to the apparent failure of the state-socialist system to provide effort and innovative 
motivation for workers, labor productivity became very low which translated into output 
shortages (Cai et al., 2008). It was evident that the current centralized allocation system was 
inefficient, thus the realization for the need for a reform. The transition to a market-oriented 
economy aimed to make a more open labor market possible where workers should no longer face 
planned allocations but should instead be allowed to freely choose between being employed in 
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SOEs or non-state private firms. This was evident since after the reform era, an increasing 
number of workers took jobs at non-state firms thus making the fraction of labor working in 
SOEs decrease from 78 percent to 24 percent from 1978 to 2005 (Cai et al., 2008). One of the 
reforms’ major goals was to remove the barrier which centrally allocated workers to SOEs 
depending on their location regardless of their education and skills (Brooks and Tao, 2003). 
Similarly to various rapidly emergent countries, the working citizens were widely affected by the 
set of transformative structural reforms which mainly brought them out of the agricultural rural 
areas into the urban industrial sectors causing the fraction of agricultural workers to decrease 
from 71 percent to 45 percent from 1978 to 2005 (Cai et al., 2008).  The main reason for the 
huge migration was the relatively high returns of nonagricultural work. As stated by Lin et al. 
(1996), the focus of the reforms on enhancing labor mobility aids in increasing citizens’ 
investment in human capital as they become aware that better education eases mobility across 
areas. Labor mobility also develops incentives to allocate resources more efficiently from the 
wider pool of available workers. These factors allow improvement in the economic performance 
since workers become motivated to exert more efforts, as well as distribute themselves in the 
appropriate sectors (Lin et al., 1996).  
In the mid-1980s, China witnessed the development of Townships and Villages 
Enterprises (TVEs) in an attempt to correct for the socialist system’s failure in creating 
incentives (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). This development enhanced the labor market outcomes as 
it absorbed the agriculture surplus workers and increased competition making the SOEs 
reconsider their inefficiencies when performing planned allocation. The fact that TVEs were 
regulated to a lesser extent and had harder budget constraints than SOEs created pressures for the 
latter and caused them to reform. The reforms ended the planned permanent employment system, 
known as the “iron rice bowl” (Gross and Dyson, 1996); and consequently permitted managers 
to hire with more flexibility based on market needs. Furthermore, the market competition made it 
possible to employ the suitable employees for the job depending on their human capital and level 
of expertise. Yet, the new labor contract system made firing or dismissing workers limited to 
only a maximum of 1 percent per year since it still allowed two routes for employment: state 
planned allocation and natural employment by firms (Fleisher and Yang, 2003). 
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With that reform taking place a privatization phenomenon followed in the 1990s where 
the state set a policy to privatize the small and medium state firms while preserving the large 
firms as SOEs. According to Brandt and Rawski (2008), the policy adopted by the Ministry of 
Labor allowed the setting of wages by firms based on skill level and productivity of the worker 
which increased efforts and incentives. Yet, regardless of the new laws, the workers with good 
education still preferred the SOEs due to the nonwage social insurance benefits they offered 
aside from the regular wage. As child care, private housing, pensions, and health care were not 
supplied by the private firms, most labor, especially those with the good human capital, favored 
working at state firms to benefit from those aids. In line with Nee and Opper (2012), through 
bottom-up change enabling the workers to take a job in the private sector through their personal 
connections and networks, the development of a new labor market was surfacing even before the 
first Labor Law. However, the low status accompanying private firms had a major role in 
influencing the network recruitment channels especially for the scarce skills and made the 
process challenging. With the 1994 Labor law taking effect, many of the workers’ rights were 
recovered. The law issued rules for equality in obtaining employment and getting the same wage 
across similar jobs, accessing social insurance and welfare, and minimum wage requirements. 
Notably, it also recognized the right for workers’ equal treatment in diverse ownership types 
(Brandt and Rawski, 2008), hence making employment at private firms more appealing. 
By the end of the 1990s, further economic restructuring ended the permanent guaranteed 
employment as well as the extensive welfares the urban employees previously enjoyed. It also 
had a major impact on the labor market as it caused the dismissal of millions of employees thus 
raising unemployment (Cai et al., 2008). Little by little, China formed a better functioning labor 
market which not only enjoyed increased mobility but also allowed the market to shape the 
employment and wage decisions in enterprises. These changes obligated a new path for China, 
one that is more market-oriented in its vision.  
Ownership system evolution 
Pre-reform the major types of firm ownerships were either state or collective. State 
ownership and collective enterprises kept dominating for a while even after the reform took 
effect. During the mid-1990s, the state allowed diversified ownerships to allow private firms’ 
emergence and to let go of the inefficient labor which negatively affected the economy (Cai et 
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al., 2008). Yet, the privatization phenomenon started prevailing in China discretely even before 
the reform took place. As stated by Nee and Opper (2012), the discretion was due to the social 
stigmatization which accompanied the private firms; they were usually considered a tail of 
capitalism as they were new elements which sought profit. However, this scenario is not unique 
to China as any de-coupling from the norm is looked upon suspiciously and faces heavy social 
stigmatization. With the 1994 Company Law designing a system of modern enterprise, the 
legitimacy was more easily established as the national policy for corporates started gaining 
private entrepreneurs’ social and political acceptance. But institutional change did not happen 
overnight; firms had felt tired of the high costs entailed to being registered as cooperative and 
collective ownerships and sought for an identity change.  Due to the corporatization policy 
aiming to turn the sector into one resembling the modern Western corporations and due to the 
Company Law which provided guidelines, mimicking the organizational behaviors of JSC and 
LLC and being registered under these names were possible routes. The aim was to find strategies 
which help converge in the outer appearance with the Modern Enterprise System to avoid public 
discrimination and establish legitimacy. Since everybody was doing the same in society, the 
process started to evolve faster. The key factor causing institutional change and triggering 
entrepreneurship was marketization and the profit making opportunities. The Company Law 
managed to reduce the intensity of government interference in enterprises, thus depriving the 
state from its previous unopposed monopoly power and control over the market (Nee and Opper, 
2012). 
Mises (1990) theorized about the importance of private ownerships in general and 
capitalist decision makers and entrepreneurs who were greatly motivated by returns. On the one 
hand, the profit-seeking capitalists are incentivized by the phenomenon of profit maximization. 
They aim to make profits and avoid losses through employing their factors of production in an 
efficient manner; and consequently, creating a market for those factors. In contrast, the collective 
or state ownership nature of a socialist society would lead the means of production to inefficient 
pricing since all resources are owned by a single entity, the government. Therefore, the socialist 
planners cannot carry out adequate calculations, decisions or plans to save the market from 
inefficiencies (Mises, 1990). Following this theory, permitting Chinese firms to dismiss 
unproductive employees and allowing inefficient firms to go bankrupt enhanced the economy 
and greased the wheel for growth. Given this permission, China faced in 1997 the dismissal of 
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tens of millions of employees, the decrease of the SOEs, and the emergence of privatized 
businesses. The number of workers almost halved between 1995 and 1998. Similarly to other 
transition economies, high unemployment followed the restructuring reforms (Brandt and 
Rawski, 2008). 
The structural transformations have undoubtedly witnessed impressive magnitudes but 
the reforms are still unfinished. The reforms were far from complete as there were many 
obstacles and challenges along the way which made them less than perfect. To what extent have 
the reforms fostered change and addressed the previously restricting issues in regard to labor 
markets? The aim of this paper is to test to what degree in year 2012, those reforms have 
succeeded in formulating an efficient labor market which functions well and has a high degree of 
mobility through testing the freedom of private firms in accessing the qualified labor market 
which makes a difference.  
2.2. Private firms and accessibility to qualified labor 
To illustrate why private firm may or may not experience a disadvantage in accessing 
labor with good human capital, two contrasting views will be discussed: one that claims that 
private firms are human capital constrained, and another which suggests that this is no longer the 
case nowadays. The former view has been frequently discussed in prior studies and many 
scholars have contributed to that literature, while the latter view proposes that private firms by 
2012 might actually have better human capital.  
Studies have shown that recruiting and retaining qualified labor is not so easy in the 
Chinese marketplace (Dessler, 2006; Wu, 2009). Private firms in China face more constraints as 
compared to the state-owned firms (Peng and Heath, 1996). Since SOEs enjoy a better status 
than private firms, they are able to acquire state-owned capital goods at a lower cost (Tan, 
2003). In the same way, it is easier for them to have access to human capital resources (Garnaut 
et al., 2012). Besides being privileged in accessibility to better resources, several studies have 
also shown that state-owned firms in China hold aside large human resource inventories 
(Kornai, 1992; Peng and Heath, 1996; Tan, 2003). In other terms, they are not just more 
advantaged when it comes to acquiring quality, but also fortunate enough to have access to a 
larger quantity from the pool of resources available in a country. Yet, additional workers prove 
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to be beneficial only if they fit the structure of the firm well; they should be well adaptable to 
the organizational habits of the firm and their skills should be utilized to alleviate and overcome 
growth constraining areas (Mishina et al., 2004). Another study by Tsai (2008) found that 
compared with developed countries, the state in China exerts great influence over firms since it 
has its hands on a major number of Chinese companies. Governmental support helps in the 
accumulation of abundant resources for the state-owned firms. Since firms’ innovative 
technology and market success is widely shaped by the quality of human capital, limitations in 
accessing the desired amount of human capital constrain firm’s innovation and success 
measures (Garnaut et al., 2012). 
The main impediments which limit private firms from obtaining or even retaining 
qualified human capital and the barriers blocking the possibility for private firms to attain better 
labor quality will be elaborated on from both perspectives: the worker’s perspective and the 
private firm’s perspective. 
From the workers’ perspective 
First, as POEs faced resource constraints, they cautiously consider raising employees’ 
wages or potential compensation for new workers which is considered to be unpleasant from the 
worker’s point of view (Garnaut et al., 2012). With the low wage offer, it was very hard for 
private firms to attract the qualified people needed for operating their firms. The less attractive 
benefits and working conditions caused the high-achieving graduates to shift their preference 
away from private firms to other types of employers. 
Second, employees, especially college graduates, were reluctant to work in stigmatized private 
firms even if they are offered higher wages since they prefer working in firms with better known 
ownership types in China such as state-owned, foreign-owned or joint ventures. They see these 
employers as offering more protection for local employment, better social insurance as well as 
better retirement benefits. Also, workers with good education tend to prefer working at SOEs in 
China due to their better standing as compared to POEs (Foneska et al., 2014). The young, newly 
born private firms sent out risky vibes for educated graduates who seek high job prospects. In 
addition, employees who mainly look for a job within a reliable, well-reputable firm have 
uncertain predictions related to the firm’s success when comparing private firms to its state-
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owned counterparts. In brief, POEs lacked the foremost prerequisite for attracting potential well-
educated workers (Williamson, 2000). 
From the private firms’ perspective 
First, given that many tasks done by newly existing private firms require a minimum 
level of skills, hiring workers with low education seems like a rational choice for them. The 
actual obstacle comes into existence when the firm starts growing and expanding in the market 
as it will demand technological innovations which can be better achieved only by employing 
workers with higher educational levels. In that case, they might consider on-the-job training of 
their employees which they find cheaper than hiring more educated workers in the first place. 
Especially considering the fact that most often, the training required by private firms falls among 
the following three categories: technical, accounting and marketing, and quality control (Garnaut 
et al., 2012). 
Second, the high turnover rate makes it unlikely that a private firm seeks investment in training 
its employees; this is turn further reduces the labor force’s skills and quality level (Foneska et al., 
2014). Workers are driven and widely motivated by wage levels. A slightly higher wage will 
make the workers, especially the unskilled ones, turn to rival companies which are offering more 
money, subsequently rendering the turnover rate high. According to Wu (2009), even foreign-
owned private firms in China face a high turnover rate yet for a different reason: due to constant 
search for qualified talent. In fact, China had the highest ranking turnover rate among other 
Asian countries after it joined the WTO (Wu, 2009). As a result to the high turnover rate, the 
private sector finds investing in training its employees unattractive and causes the current labor’s 
human capital level to diminish. 
Third, as private firms came into existence after the longstanding, well-established state-owned 
firms, the available pool of employees from which they were able to recruit is typically the 
migrant workers looking for a slightly better job in a non-rural area. The labor market’s supply 
of workers for the newly established private firms came from a large pool of agricultural labor 
force who wanted to shift to a more promising sector (Nee and Opper, 2012, p. 162). Those 
workers’ education level ended up being lower in private sector as they relocate from the inland, 
countryside provinces where the majority had only completed elementary school due to the 
scarcity of good higher education institutions in those rural areas. This was the case a while 
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back; even though more recently private firms rely on those migrant workers for the unskilled 
work, migrants still occupy a large fraction of the firms’ workforce (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). 
In contrast to the above view, other studies have also looked at the possibility that it may 
no longer be the case that private firms nowadays are human capital constrained as they are 
outperforming SOEs in some areas (Wei et al., 2003; Tong and Junarsin, 2013). State-owned 
firms face obstacles in adapting to the transition market and adjusting to the more competitive 
practices in a marketplace which includes the new privatized firms (Tong and Junarsin, 2013). A 
study by Wei et al. (2003) shows evidence that private firms in China are facing significant 
progress in their employment efficiency as compared to the state firms; meaning that the efficient 
labor force is choosing to supply its capabilities to the privatized firms. SOEs become inefficient 
as they focus on deploying their human resources in administration duties instead of bringing 
profits which is what private firms are concerned with (Li and Xia, 2008). Even though private 
firms face high resource constraints (Perkins, 1994), various studies by Li and Zhang (2007), 
Peng et al. (2004) and Tan (2002) show evidence that POEs utilize their constrained resources 
better than their state-owned counterparts. In other words, regardless of all the constraints, the 
limited resources are better utilized in private firms than in state-owned ones. Due to diverse 
ownerships, human resources are exploited in different ways and some strategies prove to be 
more beneficial than others in driving growth in China. Given the fact that almost 25 years have 
passed since the 1978 economic reform, private firms operating in 2012 might have overcame 
the stigma and pariah-like status, thus making it possible to exploit the human capital which 
make a difference. According to Gao et al. (2010), Peng et al. (2004) and Ju and Zhao (2009), the 
ownership type induces diverse limitations and benefits for a firm. The distinct characteristics, 
organizational structure and identity of firms can be reflected differently depending on the 
ownership type (Hannan and Caroll, 1992).  
Given the distinct arguments portrayed by contrasting views in the literature, this paper 
aims to identify private firms’ current standing in China when it comes to human capital access. 
It basically tests whether, in comparison to the state-owned firms, private firms are more 
constrained, equal, or even more advantaged in that regard. Therefore, in view of the above point 
of views about resource allocation, I hypothesize that the effect of ownership type on human 
capital leads to the following: 
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Hypothesis1 (H1): Chinese private firms today are still human capital constrained compared to 
state-owned firms. This means that the POEs have disadvantages in accessing and exploiting 
human capital in comparison with SOEs. 
2.3. Human capital and firm performance 
In light of the importance of the issue at hand, Chinese firms need to also grasp an 
understanding of the factors affecting their performance: whether human capital is a significant 
factor, whether the interaction of human capital and ownership limits the firm performance, and 
whether the quality of human capital encourages or constrains firm’s growth and expansion. 
Human capital proved to be a vital key for a firm’s prosperous growth, development and 
performance (Decenzo and Robbins, 1999). Standard economic theories have asserted the 
negative implications state ownership has on firm performance (Kirzner, 1984). Several scholars 
claim that resource constrained firms find it harder to undergo development as their constraints 
cause them limitations in many areas related to growth and performance (Baker and Nelson, 
2005; Starr and MacMillan, 1990; Mosakowski, 2002). Private firms’ limited access to resources 
affects their performance as well as their competitive advantage in the marketplace. Given that, 
the standing position of private firms is more risky than their counterparts as limited resources 
make it hard for POEs to compete with other types of enterprises (Garnaut et al., 2012). 
Acquiring extra resources is a firms’ strategy to accelerate its growth and expansion (Kor 
and Mohoney, 2000).  Better sales, and ultimately better performance, inspire managers to 
consider expansion opportunities for their businesses (Foneska et al., 2014). Consequently, they 
would consider employing better workers, training the existing workers, or spending more on 
durable fixed assets as first steps towards expanding the firm. Put differently, being human 
capital constrained decreases private firms’ adaptability, performance, and responses to 
enhancing standing prospects or new business chances (Tan, 2002). Also, according to Ng et al. 
(2009), the ownership type as well plays a role in contributing to the performance of a firm. 
Pitelis (2007) argues that better firm performance could be achieved through hiring more 
educated workers as they are more ambitious and would thus seek to exploit the available 
resources to expand both, their labor productivity and product quality. With better products come 
higher profits for the firm and better expansion opportunities into new markets. Another study by 
Fung (2007) also argues that firm’s profitability is greatly affected by how enriched it is with 
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human capital. Investing in human capital yields returns not only to the individual worker who 
enjoys higher earnings, but also to the firm which will benefit from a higher productivity. A firm 
with a more educated labor force can stand out from its rival firm since its average worker tends 
to be more skilled, a faster learner, and adapts better to the changing environment. So, despite the 
additional costs from hiring better labor, the increase in profits resulting from higher labor 
productivity would even out the situation (Pitelis, 2007).  
The above arguments lead to the following second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis2 (H2): The presence of better human capital in private firms has a positive 
relationship with firm performance in terms of growth and expansion. 
3 Data and Research Design 
The cross-sectional data used is extracted from the World Bank 2012 Enterprise Surveys 
database and covers country-specific questions regarding Chinese firms useful to get information 
about the business environment in China. The survey questionnaire preceding the data is titled 
“Manufacturing Module (2012) of the China-Enterprise Survey”. The dataset is composed at 
firm-level by gathering responses from business owners and top managers for 2848 privately-
owned or state-owned firms. Data for 2700 privately-owned or mixed firms and 148 fully state-
owned firms in China were provided separately, but I merge both datasets together to be able to 
study the diverse ownership effect. The only reason why both datasets were originally separated 
is to make it easier for comparison with datasets in other countries. Yet, since I am only 
interested in one country, China, the fully state-owned establishments should not be excluded 
from the sample but merged with the private firms’ data. The dataset provided is suitable to test 
various restrictions to growth and performance of firms. Specifically, it assesses the factors 
constraining private firms’ growth (World Bank, 2013).  
3.1. The Dataset 
To begin with, the sample in the dataset is quite randomly selected as it was chosen using 
stratified random sampling by including Chinese firms covering diverse sectors, industries, 
locations and sizes. The Enterprise Survey leading to the dataset formulation includes several 
sections related to various aspects of the business environment, such as infrastructure and 
services, sales and supplies, land and permits, innovation and technology, access to finance, 
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labor, and performance. It was carried out through face-to-face interviews with the firm’s owner, 
top manager or a member on the board of directors. The original goal of the surveyors was to 
achieve a target sample size of 3000 firms, yet certain shortcomings made this difficult to 
achieve, thus ending up with 2848 firms instead. Limitations related to the overall responses, 
refusals, incompleteness and eligibility rates were the main causes which rendered the sample 
size smaller than desired. Given low response rates, especially in certain cities like Shanghai, the 
dataset failed to complete the agreed upon sample size. Through a careful study of both, the 
China 2012 Implementation Report which came out on July 15, 2013 by the World Bank and 
their codebook which describes the data collection process in detail, this section will discuss the 
main issues faced and the approaches adopted to deal with them. 
Limitations with the survey and dataset 
Some problems with the survey rendered the process of collecting information tricky and 
caused limitations in the dataset. Reasons behind low response rates were mainly refusals of 
firms to participate because they did not have time, they did not want to share information, or 
they were concerned about confidentiality matters regardless of assurances from the World Bank 
team. Other common reasons for non-responses were mainly problems with phone lines such as 
being out of service or calls not being answered, and problems with addresses such as incorrect 
firm addresses or moving to new locations. Aside from survey non-response, the dataset also 
suffers from item non-response where the interviewees refuse to answer a specific question 
which they consider too sensitive, too confidential, or too personal to share. Yet, the variables for 
these kinds of questions are not part of this paper’s model, so it should not be a very serious issue 
for this study. As for the non-eligibility rates, several reasons caused the dataset to suffer as well. 
Primarily, firms that were no longer reachable or those that discontinued their work were the 
main contributors to that category. Whether firms changed locations, whether they had less than 
5 employees, or even whether they failed to reply to several attempts to reach them, all rendered 
their survey responses ineligible. Finally, quite a few firms refused to participate because of the 
simple reason that they found the questionnaire too long even though the interviewers explained 
that in some cases it was done in less than an hour. 
Despite the fact that the dataset suffers from these flaws, the problems are not atypical to 
the common ones faced when dealing with enterprise surveys. Additionally, in comparison to 
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datasets that could have been brought from other sources like the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), this dataset is qualitatively better and richer in information as it encompasses a wider 
range of questions; for example, not all surveys contain questions on employees’ number (World 
Bank, 2013). To that regard, special efforts were taken, to ensure that the exact and accurate 
number of permanent and temporary employees was reported. For those reasons and for the 
extensive efforts which will be discussed next, I chose this dataset specifically to test my models. 
Efforts to address the limitations 
Many efforts were made to try to solve for the problem of non-responses and these 
successful strategies helped in maximizing the sample size to 2848 firms. First, teams in areas 
facing difficulties in gaining the desired participation, such as those in Shanghai, were replaced 
by higher-performing teams in an attempt to correct for that issue. The World Bank offices 
recruited professionals who were better experienced at conducting interviews and gathering 
answers to the surveys by encouraging the business owners to participate. They also recruited 
teams who not only impressed through dressing formally but who also had an impressively good 
knowledge of the Chinese local business environment and knew how to address top managers 
and firms’ owners. The interviewers’ strong understanding of the local firms worked well in 
favor of the teams and got the most out of the response rates. Second, attractive eventual 
outcomes were pointed out to the hesitant interviewees to get them to participate in the survey. 
For instance, interviewers pointed out the advantages gained from participating, such as gaining 
an insight on the chief restrictions to firms’ growth, especially those targeting the private sector. 
Moreover, studying the survey and testing diverse models can influence China’s policymakers to 
address the limitations and enhance both, firms’ performance and employment opportunities. 
Third, tangible attractive offers to firms’ owners and top managers were also used as means to 
induce participation such as winning tablet computers, choosing a business-related management 
book among the 8 most popular ones in China, and getting a free 2003 Country Profile. Finally, 
one last effort was made to convince firms who originally refused to participate to change their 
minds by re-contacting them after a short while. Also, in an attempt to ensure that the 
information is reliable and up to date, 1119 out of 2848 callbacks were performed to ask about 
accuracy and verify that the interview in fact took place.  
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Given all these tempting offers and interesting efforts, the firms’ incentive to participate 
in the survey increased and the survey process took a surprisingly accelerated speed. 
Nonetheless, to fully correct for the flaws in the Enterprise Survey due to non-response and non-
eligibility rates, more research is needed; yet for the time being, this dataset is the best I could 
use to test my hypotheses as it is the most recent one. Besides, all the limitations in the dataset 
are not unique to China’s Enterprise Survey alone as all such surveys suffer from similar 
shortcomings. At least, what is very appealing about this survey is that they made all the 
weaknesses explicit and clear. 
3.2. Model Specification and methodology 
Using cross-sectional dataset, the model investigates the type of ownership (POEs or 
SOEs) effect on human capital quality and further studies how different levels of human capital 
affect firm’s performance. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is used to estimate 
the estimated equations. This is the most suitable method for this type of hypothesis testing as 
the independent variables are exogenous and there is no perfect multicollinearity as shown in 
Appendix 2. To check for the possibility of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
is calculated
1
. Multicollinearity was not likely seen as a problem to this study as the VIF range 
was from 1.02 to 1.66. Refer to Table 1 in Appendix 2 for the exact results of the VIF derived 
from the OLS regression.  Table 2 in Appendix 2 shows the correlation matrix for the variables. 
As no correlation among the variables exceeds 0.4, we can rule out the possibility of high 
correlation. Using OLS for this dataset thus gives us unbiased consistent estimates (World Bank, 
2013).  In my paper, I use it to first study the effect of ownership type on human capital quality 
as portrayed in the following equation testing H1: 
Human Capital proxies =  + Ownership + X + 
The main estimated equation for the first hypothesis uses three distinct dependent variables as 
proxies for human capital: workers’ education, skilled workers, and trained workers. Also,  is a 
constant,  is an error term, and X is a vector of control variables. 
                                                            
1 Note that the tests were run for all regressions but Appendix 2 only portrays the results for the first model 
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Then, I study the association between human capital and firms’ performance as I am 
interested in the effect human capital has on the firm’s tendency to expand and grow as 
mentioned in H2: 
Firms’ performance proxies = + HumanCapital*Ownership + HumanCapital 
+ Ownership + X +  
The main estimated equation for the second hypothesis uses two distinct dependent variables as 
proxies for firm performance: sales per employee and fixed assets per sales. Also,  is a 
constant,  is an error term, and X is a vector of control variables. 
3.3. Variables choice 
 Dependent Variables 
For H1, I use three alternative measures from the dataset to proxy for human capital: 1) 
average years of education of a worker, 2) skilled workers to total number of employees’ ratio, 
and 3) percentage of trained workers. The first measure serves as a good proxy since Lau et al. 
(1991) suggest that education is a form of investment in human capital which increases labor’s 
productivity and alternatively their human capital. The second measure is also a possible proxy 
since the higher the fraction of skilled workers, the better the quality of human capital within the 
firm. The third measure serves as a proxy for human capital as firms’ who train their employees 
are mainly concerned with adding value to their current labor force and increasing the human 
capital in their firms (Heckman, 2002). All three measures together form the whole dimensions 
of human capital as described by Schultz (1961). They are used in order to account not only for 
the acquired education level of employees through school, but also for their skill level through 
experience and subsequent training through specific firm programs. 
For H2, I also use two alternative measures from the dataset to proxy for firm 
performance: 1) last year’s total annual sales to number of full-time permanent employees’ ratio 
as a proxy for firm growth, and 2) spending on fixed assets to the total annual sales ratio as a 
proxy for firm expansion. For the first measure, I follow the studies from Datta et al. (2005), 
Huselid (1995) and Koch and McGrath (1995) who use sales per employee as a proxy for firm 
performance by dividing the total annual sales by the number of employees. The second measure 
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is a proxy for expansion since a firm looking to expand its business would invest in fixed durable 
assets according to Foneska et al. (2014). Together, both measures would account for the firm 
performance in terms of growth and expansion. 
Independent Variables 
For H1, ownership type is labeled “Private” and measured using a dummy variable 
assigned the value of 1 if the biggest shareholder (i.e., >=50%) is a private entity, while zero if 
more than 50% of ownership is controlled by the state (Wu and Pangakar, 2010; Wu, Xu, and 
Phan, 2011).  
For H2, aside from including human capital and ownership variables separately, I also 
include an interaction term between human capital and ownership type, labeled “HCOWN”, by 
multiplying them together since I am interested in testing specifically whether private firms 
which have better access to human capital resources perform better or not. Adding the interaction 
term indicates that the effect of human capital on firm performance is different for different types 
of ownership. In other words, the effect of human capital on performance is not only dependent 
on the value of  in the equation, but also on the value of , meaning: ownership is the 
total effect of human capital on performance (Verbeek, 2008). Again, three distinct measures are 
used for the interaction terms found in separate regressions as we have three different human 
capital proxies: education, skill and training. In other words, each human capital measure is 
allowed to interact separately with the ownership variable. 
Control Variables 
To decrease the possibility of confounding effects on the variables of interest and to 
factor out the possibility that the results are driven by the exclusion of certain other variables, I 
control for the following set of variables in my regression. 
Firm age: The age of the firm is held constant since it might have an effect on the outcome 
result. An older firm has better capabilities of spending on fixed assets than a relatively younger 
firm due to its better standing and superior experience in managing its capital. A longer existing, 
older firm has more chances to formulate connections, networks and links to acquire better 
human capital (Sharfman et al., 1998; Nee and Opper, 2012). I measure the age of the firm as the 
number of years it has been operating since registration (Foneska et al., 2014). 
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Firm size: Several economists suggest that a firm’s size impacts its performance (Tan and Peng, 
2003; Mishina et al., 2004). Bigger firms might take advantage of economies of scale thus enjoy 
better access to resources. I measure the firm’s size in terms of total number of permanent full-
time employees following the World Bank’s report for the survey (2013) which states that this 
variable reflects the reality of the firm very accurately. They suggest it to be the most adequate 
measure for firm size since, apart from the agriculture sector, temporary part-time employees in 
the sample firms is not such a common practice. The logic is that a firm with a higher number of 
employees will spend more on fixed assets in two ways: it will need more equipment for the new 
employees to operate, and it will need more space to avoid decreasing marginal productivity of 
labor. Hence, a higher number of employees induces the firm to increase its expenditure on fixed 
assets and plants. For robustness reasons, I also use an alternative measure for firm size, the 
natural logarithm of the total annual sales, which was also used in prior studies (Yasuda, 2005; 
Al-Khazali and Zoubi, 2011). Both measures are conventionally adopted and widely accepted as 
firm size proxies in research. 
Access to credit: The variable line of credit or a loan from a financial institution is also 
controlled for since a firm might be spending more on fixed assets due to its access to credit 
which influences its overall performance (Ju and Zhao, 2009). This does not mean that a firm is 
expanding or growing; it merely implies that the amount spent will have to be repaid in the 
future in some way to cover its account payable. In other words, this variable holds constant 
access to credit from an external source (bank, financial institution) where firms can take 
advantage of the extra income to pursue the expansion opportunities faster as they are less 
resource constrained. Additionally, the banking sector has not undergone reforms and still faces 
state intervention and power (Woo, 2002). Political authority which favors state firms will lend 
out to the state sector more than the private one.  
Industry type: The firms in the dataset belong to different industries and thus face distinct 
profit-making opportunities. The nature and degree of complexity of the industry affects the 
outcome result as well. Firms belonging to the same industry share homogeneous needs that 
differ from those in other sectors, hence affecting firm expenditures. Depending on the sector it 
belongs to, a firm will have industry-specific requests for resources and fixed assets whose prices 
fluctuate from one industry to the other (Foneska et al., 2014). It is measured as a categorical 
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variable divided according to FTSE Industry Classification Benchmark (2010). Based on FTSE, 
the 30 industries are divided into 7 main categories and classified as one of the following: 
consumer goods, basic materials, consumer services, oil and gas, industrials, technology, and 
state-owned. It is important to note here that the fully government-owned firms are all put in a 
separate group labeled “state-owned” regardless of the firm’s specific industry it belongs to. For 
instance, a bakery operating primarily in food manufacturing industry but owned by the state 
would be classified in the state-owned group instead of the consumer goods industry. This is 
mainly to maintain the private groups’ representativeness according to the World Bank report 
(2013). 
Region: Region is being controlled for since a company located in more firm-clustered regions 
will have a higher opportunity to acquire resources and fixed assets at a lower cost (Foneska et 
al., 2014). Higher concentration of firms in the same region will cause higher demand for 
resources and thus, suppliers are obligated to lower their market prices. I suspect that clustering 
leads to a positive effect on purchase of fixed assets. To control for region fixed effects, I divide 
the 25 cities from the survey into 5 different regions in China according to their geographical 
location: North, South, East, West and Middle. 
The importance of both, industry and region, in a Chinese context has also been previously 
established by Bai et al. (2004). Large disparities among levels of education among the different 
industries and regions imply that labor mobility is restricted and work is inefficient (Garnaut et 
al., 2012). For the exact division of the diverse industries and cities into categories, refer to Table 
1 and Table 2 respectively, in Appendix 1.  Even though they are controlled for, I do not report 
region and industry estimates with the models’ results for clearer, more concise tables. 
The variables used in the estimation strategy are defined in more details in Table 1 with a 
focus on their alphanumeric symbol (in parentheses) as coded in the Enterprise Survey, their 
definition, and their exact measure. 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
H1:     Dependent Variables  
Average years of education of a worker (l9a) Average number of years of education of a  
   typical permanent full-time production   
   worker employed in the firm (in years) 
Skilled workers to number of employees ratio  
    (l4a/l1) 
The fraction of skilled workers, out of the total  
   number of employees in the firm (ratio) 
Trained production employees as a percent of  
   the production full-time employees (l11a) 
Percentage of production full-time permanent  
   employees trained (in percent) 
  
H1:     Independent Variable  
 Private [ownership dummy] (b2) =1 if firm is >=50% privately owned (domestic  
   or foreign), =0 if firm is >= 50% state-owned 
H2:    Dependent Variables  
Last year’s total annual sales to number of  
   employees ratio [log] (d2/l1) 
Log of total annual sales for all products and  
   services at the end of 2011, out of total  
   number of permanent employees  
Spending on fixed assets to the total annual  
   firm sales ratio (n5a/d2)  
Spending on purchase of (new or used)  
   machinery, vehicles and equipment out of  
   the total annual firm sales (ratio) 
H2:    Independent Variables  
Human capital*Ownership: 
 
     HCOWN1 
     HCOWN2 
     HCOWN3 
 
Interaction terms between 3 human capital  
   proxies and ownership type of a firm: 
     education-ownership  (l9a*ownership) 
     skill-ownership           (l4a/l1*ownership) 
     training-ownership      (l11a*ownership) 
    Control Variables  
Firm size:  
   Full-time, permanent employees log(l1), OR 
   Last year’s total annual sales to number of  
   employees ratio log(d2) 
Log of the number of full time, permanent  
   employees at the end of 2011 
Log of total annual sales 
Firm age: (b5) Age of the firm until 2012 measured by  
   subtracting b5 from 2012 (in years) 
Access to credit [dummy] (k8) 
= 1 if firm has a line of credit or a loan from  
   financial institution, = 0 otherwise 
Region (a2) 
Region included as a categorical variable to  
   account for regional fixed effects for 5     
   distinct Chinese areas 
Industry (a4a) 
Industry included as a categorical variable to  
   account for industry fixed effects for 7  
   distinct industries 
Note: The alphanumeric value in parentheses indicates the respective symbol of the variables as labeled in the survey and dataset 
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3.4. Descriptive statistics 
According to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2, the main variables of interest 
have more than 1300 observations each. For the dependent variable last year’s total annual sales 
to number of employees’ ratio, the missing observations are so few rendering the sample size 
equal to 2839. Also, note that the mean of the variable average years of education is around 10 
years indicating that employees in China have, on average, completed secondary school at least.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables       Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
     
Average years of education (H1) 1691 10.2 1.9 1 18 
Skilled workers to number of employees ratio (H1) 1715 0.3 0.2 0 0.9 
Trained production employees (H1) 1472 91.6 19.1 0 100 
 
Log of last year’s total annual sales to number of  
    employees ratio (H2) 2839 12.5 1.2 2.0 19.5 
Spending on fixed assets to the total annual firm  
    sales ratio (H2) 1315 0.3 8.3 0 300 
      
Independent variables      
Private (H1) [dummy] 
2848 0.9 0.3 0 1 
Human capital*Ownership (H2): 
    HCOWN1 
1691 9.6 3.0 0 18 
    HCOWN2    
1715 0.3 0.2 0 0.9 
    HCOWN3 
1472 85.2 29.4 0 100 
 
     
Control Variables 
     Firm size:  
    Log of number of employees 
2847 4.2 1.4 1.4 10.8 
    Log of total annual sales 
2840 16.7 1.8 9.2 24.4 
Firm age 
2767 13.1 8.9 0 133 
Access to credit [dummy] 
2732 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Region [categorical] 
2848 - - - - 
Industry [categorical] 
2848 - - - - 
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4 Results and Discussion 
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the first hypothesis testing the effect of ownership 
type on three distinct types of human capital: workers’ education, skills, and training. For 
robustness, models (1) to (3) are estimated using the region and industry clusters as classified in 
Appendix 1, while models (4) to (5) account for the fixed effects of the 25 cities and 28 
industries separately without clustering. As the firms in China are greatly affected by the 
industry they belong to or the region they are located in, the interpretation at different levels of 
clustering makes sense. I cluster regions to account for the different degrees of regional variation 
in China which is evident through the widening inequality between firms located in inland 
provinces or coastline cities. According to Li (2009), the efficiency is shaped by different 
intensities with which firms engage in diverse activities and is among the main reasons behind 
the regional variations in China. As for the industries, the manufacturing firms that belong to the 
same category face the same conditions in general, thus it might be better to consider them under 
the same group instead of separate ones. Also, note that all regressions are run using White-
robust standard errors to account for issues that might bias the estimates, in particular the 
standard errors, when some of the assumptions from OLS are not met such as heteroskedasticity, 
heterogeneity and lack of normality (Verbeek, 2008).  
To start with, regression (1) uses labor’s years of education as a proxy for human capital 
within a firm. With a significant estimate of 0.51 for private at all levels, this model shows that, 
ceteris paribus, a firm that is privately owned has a labor force who is, on average, 0.51 years 
more educated as compared to a state-owned firm’s workforce. This indicates that hypothesis 1 
is rejected when human capital is measured as years of education of the worker; a positive and 
statistically significant estimate shows evidence that in year 2012, private firms are no longer 
disadvantaged when it comes to accessing the pool of well-educated workers. As a matter of fact, 
model (1) asserts that POEs employ higher educated labor compared to their state-owned 
counterparts. 
Regressions (2) and (3) run the same model yet using different dependent variables, mainly the 
fraction of skilled workers and the percentage of trained workers, respectively, as measures of 
human capital within a firm. Both models give negative estimates that are statistically significant 
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at all levels, hence implying a negative association between privately-owned firms and the 
quality of human capital. Specifically, controlling for other variables, a firm which is privately 
owned has 13% less skilled and 4.38% less trained labor force than its state-owned counterpart. 
This result is in line with hypothesis 1 which claims that POEs today are still human capital 
constrained in certain areas in comparison to state-owned firms. A significant negative estimate 
shows that private firms are disadvantaged in exploiting human capital when it comes to the type 
of workers who are skilled and trained. Even though private firms might be getting the educated 
labor force as portrayed in model (1), they might not be getting the labor force that matters since 
skills and training contribute greatly to the quality of human capital. As shown by the results 
from models (2) and (3), SOEs seem to have a superior advantage in acquiring skilled labor and 
furthermore, training them. 
Table 3: Estimation results for the effect of ownership type on human capital quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Education Skilled Trained Education  Skilled Trained 
Private 0.51
***
 -0.13
***
 -4.38
***
 0.29 -0.13
***
 -7.06
***
 
 (0.18) (0.02) (1.17) (0.21) (0.02) (1.39) 
       
Firm size  0.07
*
 -0.01
*
 0.04 0.05 -0.01
***
 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.38) (0.03) (0.00) (0.37) 
       
Firm age 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
       
Access to 
credit 
0.11 -0.03
**
 -1.98
*
 0.10 -0.01 1.44 
 (0.10) (0.01) (1.17) (0.11) (0.01) (1.25) 
       
Constant 9.13
***
 0.54
***
 97.78
***
 8.58
***
 0.62
***
 104.13
***
 
 (0.23) (0.03) (2.18) (0.35) (0.05) (2.97) 
Industry Clustered Clustered Clustered Non-clustered Non-clustered Non-clustered 
Region Clustered Clustered Clustered Non-clustered Non-clustered Non-clustered 
Observations 1593 1618 1385 1593 1618 1385 
Adjusted R
2
 0.106 0.045 0.054 0.246 0.270 0.180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Regression (4) is similar to (1) yet the region and industry fixed effect are less constrained as 
they are no longer clustered into groups. When regional and industrial variations are allowed to 
be more specific, the estimate for ownership is no longer significant even though it remains 
positive (0.29). This shows that after all, ownership type might not be greatly associated with the 
type of labor a firm gets when human capital is measured as years of education. 
As for regressions (5) and (6), the results remain consistent with the prior ones from (2) and (3), 
which had significant and negative estimates for the variable of interest. In more detail, when I 
do not cluster for the industry and region, model (5) gives the exact same result as model (3) 
showing that a POE has 13% less skilled workers than SOE, ceteris paribus. As for model (6), 
the outcome remains statistically significant at all levels, yet becomes even more negative 
indicating that POEs have 7.06% less trained workers than their counterparts, thus further 
asserting hypothesis 1. 
The control variables also show some interesting outcomes. The firm age seems to have a 
negligible effect on human capital quality as the estimates are insignificant and close to zero in 
all the models. Both firm size and access to credit are positive for the models with education as 
the dependent variables, while negative for the other models, with the exception of access to 
credit in model (6) which has a positive estimate yet insignificant so it does not have much to 
say. Regression (1) suggests that an older firm will have more educated labor which might be 
because it has been operating longer and can be considered well-established and from the 
workers’ perspective.  Table 3 also shows that the older the firm is, the less it will have skilled 
labor, yet the result is very small (-0.01). As for access to credit, models (2) and (3) only show 
significant results for the estimates hence suggesting that a firm with access to loans will have 
lower skilled labor and will invest less in training its employees, possibly because it is employing 
its extra credit elsewhere. The other estimates do not say much as they are insignificant. 
The adjusted R
2
 seems low for the first 3 models ranging between 5% and 10% yet this 
should not be viewed as a serious problem as it does not render the model useless. According to 
Stock and Watson (2012) and Verbeek (2008), the R
2
 shows the explanatory power of a model 
for it indicates what percent of the variability of the dependent variable is explained by the 
chosen regressors. The low adjusted R
2
 might be simply stating that, aside from ownership type 
and the other listed variables, other factors contribute to the human capital found in a firm as 
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well. To name a few predictors that could be potential contributors, the situation in a country 
(economy, war…) or location of a firm (rural, urban…) are among the many other examples that 
might affect a firm’s access to human capital. Yet, the aim of this paper is not to put all factors 
that might give better predicted outcomes, but to simply check if there is in fact a reliable 
relationship between the variables of interest. Significance is still meaningful, and important 
conclusions could still be drawn regardless of the small values of adjusted R
2
. Besides, the 
explanatory power of the model increases to a range between 18% - 27% when industry and 
region are no longer clustered which further emphasizes that the exact location of a firm is a 
good predictor of its human capital quality. For instance, model (5) explains 27% of the 
variability in the data around its mean. In light of China’s policy and institutional environment, 
the justification why non-clustered version give better results might be accounting for the fact 
that even firms in same region (for example, East) but belonging to a different city within the 
same region might witness different conditions which renders their access to labor different. 
Table 4: The effect of ownership on human capital quality using different measure for firm size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Education  Skilled Trained Education  Skilled Trained 
Private 0.52
***
 -0.14
***
 -4.42
***
 0.30 -0.13*** -7.13*** 
 (0.18) (0.02) (1.17) (0.21) (0.02) (1.38) 
       
Firmsize2 0.08
**
 -0.01
***
 -0.10 0.06** -0.01*** -0.27 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.30) (0.03) (0.00) (0.30) 
       
Firmage 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
       
Access to 
credit 
0.09 -0.02 -1.86 0.07 -0.01 1.69 
 (0.10) (0.01) (1.17) (0.11) (0.01) (1.22) 
       
Constant 8.17
***
 0.72
***
 99.64
***
 7.87*** 0.76*** 108.31*** 
 (0.51) (0.06) (5.16) (0.56) (0.07) (5.49) 
Industry  Clustered Clustered Clustered Non-
clustered 
Non-
clustered 
Non-
clustered 
Region  Clustered Clustered Clustered Non-
clustered 
Non-
clustered 
Non-
clustered 
Observations 1593 1618 1385 1593 1618 1385 
Adjusted R
2
 0.108 0.052 0.054 0.248 0.273 0.180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 runs the same regressions as those in Table 3 but explores a different measure for 
firm size (Firmsize2). For robustness reasons, I use an alternative measure for firm size: the 
natural logarithm of the total annual sales, instead of number employees, which is widely 
accepted in the literature as a potential measure of a firm’s size (Yasuda, 2005; Al-Khazali and 
Zoubi, 2011); basically the more sales a firm has, the more likely it is bigger is size. Both 
measures are conventionally adopted and widely accepted as firm size proxies in research. My 
aim is to test whether the results will remain robust and were not driven by the choice of a 
certain variable. The results using the alternative measure for firm size remain the same in terms 
of signs of the estimates and level of significance, with approximately the same estimate when 
rounded to the tenths. Even the direction of the control variables estimates remains consistent. 
This proves robustness of the results against changing the firm size measure.  
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the second hypothesis testing the effect of human 
capital and ownership on firm’s performance in terms of growth and expansion. To proxy for 
firm performance in terms of growth, I use total annual sales per employee (Sales/empl) as a 
dependent variable in models (1), (3) and (6). Then, to proxy for firm performance in terms of 
expansion, I use purchase of fixed assets per total annual sales (FA/sales) as a dependent variable 
in models (2), (4) and (6). The models also explore the three distinct measures of human capital: 
workers’ education, skills, and training. Furthermore, I conjecture an interaction effect between 
ownership type and human capital level; thus, an interaction term is also added by multiplying 
ownership type by each of the human capital measures which are labeled HCOWN1, HCOWN2 
and HCOWN3. In each model, the estimate for the interaction term will be the main focus as the 
interest is whether specifically private firms with better access to human capital resources 
perform better or not. 
First, models (1) and (2) use HCOWN1 which is an interaction term between ownership 
type and years of education. The estimate 0.01 from models (1) and (2) portray the hypothesized 
positive sign implied by hypothesis 2, yet the results are not statistically significant at any level; 
meaning that, hypothesis 2 could be rejected as the model does not predict a reliable association 
between private firms who have more educated labor force and their performance neither in 
terms of growth nor expansion. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for the effect of human capital and ownership on firm performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sales/empl FA/sales Sales/empl FA/sales Sales/empl FA/sales 
HCOWN1 0.01 0.01     
 (0.08) (0.01)     
       
HCOWN2   1.28
*
  0.03*   
   (0.66) (0.02)   
       
HCOWN3     -0.01 0.00 
     (0.01) (0.00) 
       
Private -0.18 -0.08 -0.73
**
 -0.00 1.28 -0.08 
 (0.80) (0.08) (0.36) (0.03) (1.44) (0.08) 
       
Educated  0.02 -0.00     
 (0.08) (0.01)     
       
Skilled   -1.66
**
 0.02   
   (0.65) (0.04)   
       
Trained      0.01 -0.00 
     (0.01) (0.00) 
       
Firmsize -0.04 -0.01
***
 -0.04
*
 -0.01
***
 -0.03 -0.02
***
 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
       
Firmage 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Access to credit 0.34
***
 0.02
**
 0.34
***
 0.02
**
 0.37
***
 0.02
**
 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
       
Constant 12.12
***
 0.14
*
 13.10
***
 0.12
***
 11.03
***
 0.16
**
 
 (0.78) (0.08) (0.39) (0.03) (1.44) (0.08) 
Observations 1593 843 1618 853 1385 784 
Adjusted R
2
 0.048 0.031 0.061 0.023 0.049 0.035 
Note: All models include industry and region fixed effects clustered into categories according to Appendix 1. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Second, models (3) and (4) use HCOWN2 which is an interaction term between 
ownership type and the fraction of skilled labor to test whether private firms who have a higher 
fraction of skilled labor per their total number of employees are better capable of growing and 
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expanding. The results from model (3) support hypothesis 2 as the estimate for HCOWN2 is 
positive and significant at the 10% level. This outcome basically says that private firms who 
have more skilled labor within their workforce are 1.28 times more likely to have higher sales 
per employee. It is also interesting to note that the estimate for private ownership type separately 
is negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.73) which implies that private firms tend to have 
lower sales per employee than their state-owned counterpart. As for model (4), again a positive 
significant estimate of 0.03 at the 10% level gives more empirical support to hypothesis 2. The 
result shows that more skilled labor in private firms is associated with more spending on fixed 
assets as a fraction of total annual sales. 
Lastly, models (5) and (6) from Table 5 run the regressions using HCOWN3 which is an 
interaction term between ownership type and percentage of trained labor from the total number 
of employees in a firm. With insignificant estimates very close to zero, this variable does not 
seem to affect firm’s performance neither in terms of more sales nor in terms of more spending 
on fixed assets. Thus, hypothesis 2 does not seem to find strong empirical support except for 
when the labor force present in private firms is sufficiently skilled.  
As for the control variables estimates, the most interesting result is that for the variable 
“Access to credit” which is always positive and highly statistically significant for all the models. 
This estimate implies that firms with access to credit tend to perform better both in terms of 
growth and expansion. For instance, if a firm has access to a line of credit from banks or another 
financial institution, it will tend to have higher sales and spend more on purchase of fixed assets 
(machinery, vehicles, equipment…). This is quite intuitive as a firm who is given a loan is better 
capable of using the credit to ameliorate it performance. Thus, a potential policy implication 
might be to allow more access to credit for private firms and give out loans which will support 
their progress. The age of the firm again, does not seem to have any effect on the dependent 
variables since it is insignificant and almost zero for all regressions. Moreover, the larger the 
firm is, the less its growth and expansion which is quite surprising given the fact that a larger 
firm might take advantage of economies of scale which will positively impact its performance 
(Tan and Peng, 2003; Mishina et al., 2004).  
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More generally, the results from hypothesis 1 are mixed. The model finds significant 
evidence supporting the claim that private firms are human capital constrained in terms of skilled 
and trained labor force. Yet, the evidence displaying that private firms get better educated labor 
when measured in terms of average years of education suggests that there is something more to 
the story. It might no longer be the case that private firms are disadvantaged in the access to the 
qualified educated labor, but only in the utilization of such labor. What the evidence portrays 
exactly is that private firms do not properly exploit the educated human capital due to shortages 
in training them, and subsequently, adding to their experience and skills. In other words, private 
firms seem to have difficulties in retaining the good human capital which may make it seem like 
SOEs have richer human capital because of government support and favorable access to these 
human resources. However, the main weakness that private firms face in keeping the good labor 
is a lack of investment in their skill level and training. According to the result of the model, state-
owned firms seem to be doing a better job in that regard. The outcomes are aligned with prior 
studies in China claiming that private firms require a minimum level of labor skills to operate in 
the start since many tasks done by newly existing firms do not require advanced experience 
(Garnaut et al., 2012). According to Wu (2009), the SOEs are still the number one competitors in 
the economy occupying the most skilled labor due to the safe vibe they send out with respect to 
job security. Given this plausible reason, private firms are lacking behind in terms of holding the 
human capital which makes a difference.  
Another plausible explanation to why private firms have access to educated workers but 
are still disadvantaged in accessing skilled or trained workers is the following. The universal 
access plan that was proposed by the Higher Education (2004) had put millions of Chinese 
citizens into education and has increased the number of graduates widely (Wu, 2009). Many 
graduates will have completed several years of education successfully yet with no actual real life 
skills or experience (Huang, 2003). In other words, except for having a diploma in a certain field 
and adding to their years of education, graduates have not received any real training in the work 
area and do not have the necessary competence in firms. Thus, private firms might have access to 
the educated labor only because their quantity increased overall which might explain the 
interesting positive sign for this dependent variable. However, those laborers do not really have 
any skill or training so they cannot add to the firm’s successfulness. All they have is a degree on 
a paper which states that they have completed specific years of education which might win them 
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scholarships but may not give them experience and skills. The private firms might be facing a 
larger pool of educated workers in general who still lack the required skills and training in the 
job field, hence its better access to the educated workforce. Furthermore, the students are 
increasingly majoring in the arts section instead of the science since the year 2000 as claimed by 
the Chinese Ministry of Higher Education. In fact, less than 10 percent of the graduates applying 
for jobs are from the categories that matter for the Chinese industry such as engineering, 
financing, accounting, and nursing (Farrell and Grant, 2005). The shortage of talents as Wu 
(2009) described it, and the unbalanced ratio of major specialization are all factors affecting the 
access of private firms to the labor that matters. 
As for hypothesis 2 studying the effect of human capital on firm performance, the 
outcomes suggest the following. The estimated results propose that the only type of human 
capital which makes a difference in private firms is the skilled labor as the other two aspects of 
human capital did not give significant results. Theoretical background supports the fact that 
resource constraints in a multiple areas may inhibit firm development; yet, resource abundance is 
not a sufficient condition on its own for firm success and performance enhancement. The 
presence of skilled labor in private firms, portrayed by the term “HCOWN2”, seem to affect 
firm’s performance in terms of more sales, as well as in terms of more spending on fixed assets. 
The intuition behind that might be that as the firm realizes that its workforce is skilled, it invests 
more in machinery and equipment to expand its business. As the skilled employees utilize the 
new equipment, their productivity increases thus the sales of the firm increase as well. The 
results are also aligned with prior studies (Kor and Mohoney, 2000; Foneska et al., 2014).  
This study’s findings may aid state authorities in understanding the need to further target 
policy measures aiming at a more efficient use of human resource allocation. It has significant 
implications for both firm employment practices and policymakers’ decision making. The 
shortage does not seem to be in supplying private firms with educated labor, but in ameliorating 
the workforce by investing in their skills and training them. As skilled workers seem to enhance 
a firm’s performance, the responsible authorities should be keen on targeting this aspect exactly. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper examined the effect of ownership type on human capital by studying 2848 
firms in China from 2012 to determine whether private firms are still human capital constrained. 
The focus was on the situation of both the labor market and ownership system evolution to be 
able to analyze why private firms were disadvantaged previously and might still be. The main 
finding is that private firms still face human capital constraints, yet in only some aspects of 
human capital and not all. In light of the policy background and China’s politicized capitalist 
economy, the need for a state arises from the need to maximize social gains, make fast decisions, 
and take decisive actions due to its authority and power. The state is involved in risk-sharing of 
losses which eases the firm’s constraints but negatively affects their efficiency (Kornai, 1990). 
The Chinese pre-reform socialist system with total government involvement in all affairs made 
the state become self-undermining as it was determined to central plan hence accumulating 
inefficiencies, under-delivering and not covering the needs of society. From here emerged the 
motivation for a modern enterprise market and the steps for reforms.  
To what extent has China completed its transition towards a real labor market free from 
restrictions? The degree to which labor market reforms are successfully implemented is on one 
hand conditional on other adopted reforms and on the other hand, affecting other intended 
reforms, thus its important role. Comparative advantage, and ultimately efficiency, is achieved 
by employing the workforce based on their area of strength and human capital background. Also, 
generating incentives by rewarding the workers on their skills is a great driver for productivity 
and the establishment of a market system. However, since forming such a system demands huge 
political modifications, institutional change, and major structural adjustments, the once socialist 
state has gone great miles towards a more market-oriented economy but did not yet fully 
complete its transition.  
The labor market reforms are still far from being perfect, complete, or easy for China 
which is still expected to undergo a lot of changes to successfully finish its transition. China 
needs to uphold its reformative effort to preserve its rapidly growing trajectory. The political 
power needed to divert from a set of policies which once favored urban workers and guaranteed 
their state-sector jobs is still an obstacle hindering complete institutional change somehow. 
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Those policies which assured the urban workers their jobs enforced strict constraints on labor 
mobility especially from the rural areas. Even though the reforms began around the 1980s, up 
until the mid-1990s managers in POEs were not given total freedom to fire employees as they 
see fit since the state continued to place the fresh graduates into jobs to prevent unemployment. 
This is an indication of the slow process reforms go through in order to achieve their aim. 
Furthermore, although China had low unemployment at that time, the labor resources were 
allocated inefficiently into the state-sector jobs.  
To sum up, there are various challenges still facing the Chinese economy regardless of all 
the reforms that has been happening. Whether it is the once socialist state, the uncompleted 
transition, the asymmetric wage and nonwage benefits incentives, or the shortage of skills, 
private firms still face disadvantages to some extent. To succeed in acquiring the good human 
capital, it might not be enough to put reforms alone. This study suggests the necessity to carry on 
with transformation in the labor market. Policy recommendations might consider paying more 
attention to the pool of talent within the country, to the recruitment channels through which 
workers enter a firm, and to supplying the private firms with the needed funds for training 
programs within the firm to enhance employees’ skills and abilities. 
This research paper examined the human capital-ownership insights and their 
implications for firm employment practices and policymakers’ decision making. It also discussed 
the theoretical contributions of these findings. However, this study has some inherent 
shortcomings that might lead to productive future research. Primarily, the focus on the broad 
types of ownerships in China, mainly POEs and SOEs, ignores the rich variety of Chinese firms’ 
organizational structure such as foreign-owned versus domestic-owned firms and other “hybrid” 
types combining both. Another limitation might be the fact that the data on the variables of 
interest all came from the same source: the World Bank Enterprise Survey and lacked 
diversification. For instance, firms’ ROA and ROE measure might have portrayed better 
measures for firm performance. Also, the flaws with the response rate which induces missing 
data of firms as mentioned in the Chinese implementation report (2013) might have also been an 
issue. Also, hypothesis 2 faces a possibility that the effect between the variables of interest works 
in both directions: X affecting Y and Y affecting X. It could be that not only does the human 
capital quality affects firm performance as the latter might not be strictly exogenous in the sense 
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that better standing firms are better able to acquire the good human capital; which further 
induces the good firms to grow and expand faster. To deal with this problem, introducing lag 
performance measures might partially solve the issue (Nee and Opper, 2007). Plus, even though 
China has gone a long way in to transition, the economy is still a niche for bribery actions and 
malfeasance which also affect both resource allocation and firm performance (Nee and Opper, 
2007). Finally, further research is also required to investigate related robustness of the measures 
used to proxy for human capital.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1: Industries classification according to FTSE Industry Classification Benchmark (2010) 
Categorized Industry  Industry subgroups from survey 
Consumer goods Food, tobacco, textiles, garments, leather, furniture, recorded 
media  
Basic materials Wood, paper, chemicals, plastic and rubbers, non-metallic 
mineral products, basic metals, fabricated metal products 
Consumer services Retail, wholesale, hotel and restaurants, services of motor 
vehicles 
Oil and gas Refined petroleum product 
Industrials Machinery and equipment, electronics, transport machines, 
recycling, construction section, transport section 
Technology Precision instruments, IT 
State-owned 100% government owned firms 
 
 
 
Table 2: Cities classification into 5 Chinese regions 
Region Cities from the survey 
North Beijing, Tangshan, Shenyang, Dalian, Qingdao, Yantai 
South Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Foshan, Dongguan 
East Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Jinan, Shijiazhuang, Wenzhou, 
Nantong, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Hefei 
West Chengdu 
Middle Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Wuhan 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 1: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for variables from regression 1 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ownership  1.30 0.769637 
firm size 1.18 0.849694 
firm age 1.12 0.895724 
access to credit  1.13 0.887236 
region  1.12-1.66 0.896420-0.602544 
industry 1.02-1.46 0.983933-0.683928 
Mean VIF 1.26  
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for variables 
  education skilled trained ownership firmsize firmage credit region industry 
education 1 
        skilled -0.0656 1 
       trained 0.0506 -0.0123 1 
      ownership 0.029 -0.1969 -0.0628 1 
     firmsize 0.0665 -0.0928 -0.0256 -0.0716 1 
    firmage 0.0438 0.0363 0.0229 -0.175 0.2008 1 
   credit 0.0156 -0.0797 -0.0746 0.0692 0.2596 0.0217 1 
  region 0.0803 -0.0975 0.059 0.1303 0.0719 -0.001 -0.0243 1 
 industry 0.0506 0.0481 -0.0094 -0.4333 0.125 0.2008 0.01 -0.0158 1 
 
Graph 1: Histogram of residuals (right skewness) Graph 2: Scatterplot of residuals 
         
 
